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The purpose of this paper is to explore the notion of corporate responsibility across time, so-
called diachronic responsibility (French 2017; Khoury 2013). The motivation for taking up the 
issue is twofold. First, guidance is needed in order to make corporate moral agents who are 
capable of responding to large-scale systemic problems such as digitalization and climate 
change (Mulgan 2018). Corporate agents with a moral capacity for solving systemic problems 
should at least be able to account for their historic responsibility for past harms they have caused 
(Mena et al. 2016; Schrempf-Stirling et al. 2016), but they should also acknowledge the present 
and forward-looking duties of a communal, political, and shared kind of responsibility (Young 
2011). A formalistic, a-temporal concept of corporate moral agency is not fit for accounting for 
how to respond to larger systemic problems, as these are typically of a historical nature and 
pertain to future generations.  
The second motivation for this paper’s focus on time and corporate moral agency responds to 
a gap in the research literature. For decades, the debate on corporate moral agency – initiated 
by Peter French’s seminal 1979 article on the corporation as a moral person – has tended to be 
marginal, except for a few major contributions (e.g. Donaldson 1982). However, more recently, 
the debate has gained renewed traction (e.g. List and Pettit 2011; Orts and Craig Smith 2017) 
with a resurgence in the philosophy of the organization (Herzog 2018; Tollefsen 2015) and a 
wider debate about the political theory of firms (Ciepley 2018; Anderson 2017). A commonality 
of these debates is the shared and underlying consensus of making business firms morally 
accountable (Hess 2017); not least due to the corporate failures revealed by the financial crisis 
(Rangan 2015). But a gap can be identified in this emerging literature: not taking the time 
dimension into account. Peter French, though, proposes such an account of the diachronic moral 
responsibility of firms (2017), while also retaining his prior ‘synchronic’ view that corporations 
are equal members of the moral community. French explores two theories about corporate 
diachronic identity, viz. psychological connectedness between prior and present identities, and 
the corporate self-narrative that can provide for consistency in the organization over time – 
French refers to this as diachronic ‘sameness’.  
The focus is on the narrative theory in this paper, probing whether it provides a convincing 
amendment to the influential and more synchronically-oriented theory of corporate moral 
agency offered by List and Pettit (2011; Pettit 2007; 2017). More generally, the paper probes 
how corporate diachronic responsibility provides an account for how business firms and 
organizations in general can take the future into account when responding to present crises of 
a systemic nature. Here, the cases of climate change and digitalization are explored. 
 
Advancing Enlightenment and the philosophical approach 
The paper thus explores the pivotal Enlightenment idea of personal moral autonomy (expressed 
in Kant’s Sapere Aude dictum) by seeking to extend rationality and autonomy to also include 
organizations. This goes somewhat against the grain of Enlightenment thinking about what an 
organization is. We inherited the idea that, through planning and bureaucracy, organizations 
are mere instruments for realizing the ideals of reason and freedom. This Kantian view comes 
to expression in Weber’s theory of the bureaucracy but, with the advent of modernity, the 
system of bureaucracy expands to colonize the human lifeworld as envisaged by Habermas 
(Herzog 2018). Attempts to reclaim the system and to make business organizations morally 
accountable can be seen as an extension of the Enlightenment vision that organizations should 
be in the service of emancipation and basic human rights (cf. Anderson 2017). However, the 
question is whether the notion of corporate moral agency is going too far by extending 
autonomy to also include collectives. In that sense, corporations are not mere instruments or 
systems, but rather are agents per se. 
The paper also suggests taking the philosophical approaches, epistemologies, and methods 
exemplified in the current theorizing about corporate moral agency as helpful instruments in 
the attempt to rethink organization by means of philosophy. Connecting the philosophical 
debate on corporate moral agency with organization theory also paves the way for further 
innovation in the thinking about organization (cf. Phillips & Margolis 1999; Heugens & Scherer 
2010). 
 
The paper proceeds in three sections. First, the literature and theory of corporate moral agency 
with a particular view to the moderate collectivist stance of List and Pettit (2011) is reviewed. 
Second, the notion of corporate diachronic responsibility, based on French’s proposal for 
corporate ‘self-narratives’ as the grounding of moral capacity on the part of corporate 
collectives, is introduced. Third, a notion of time-sensitive corporate moral agency is proposed, 
based on the prior sections and applied to two cases of systemic problems: climate change and 
digitalization. 
 
1. Review of corporate moral agency literature and List-Pettit functionalism 
The received view of moral agency holds that only human persons are eligible moral agents 
because they are embodied, and have a conscience and the ability to empathize with others. 
Calling this the phenomenological account of moral agency based on the capacity for first-
person self-aware lived experience, collectives, groups, and corporations fall short of qualifying 
as moral agents. Hence, the very idea that a corporation exhibits the traits of persons can be 
seen as ludicrous (cf. Bakan 2004). Or, as Robert Reich responded to the idea in a comment on 
the Citizens United verdict which assigned the right of freedom of speech to corporations: “I’ll 
believe corporations are people when Texas executes one” (Reich 2012). Hence, corporate 
moral agency is an essentially contested concept (Kusch 2014, 1593). 
However, assuming that moral agency does not necessarily require human abilities but can be 
rendered plausible in functionalist terms, corporations might be real moral persons – or agents, 
to use the less controversial term. French (1979) argued that corporations are fully fledged 
moral persons insofar as they exhibit the competence to perform morally, based on a ‘corporate 
internal decision structure’. List and Pettit (2011) continue the defense of the functionalist 
stance on ‘group agency’ by referring to a corporate decision procedure, often formalized in a 
constitution, executed by vote, or exercised by delegation to sub-groups or a representative 
(Pettit 2007, 180). Importantly, group autonomy should be preserved by avoiding group 
decisions being reduced to the decisions of individual members of the group (e.g. by an 
aggregation of votes).  
The ‘discursive dilemma’ proposed by List and Pettit is core to rendering a formal argument 
for why groups are genuine autonomous agents over and above the individuals which inhabit 
them. This does not mean that group agents are possible without individual members, but rather 
it requires that a group agent supervenes on the acts of individual members (List & Pettit 2011, 
64). The critics Rönnegaard and Velasquez (2017, 136) argue against the formalism of the 
functionalist account that “a code of conduct cannot be morally responsible”. Hess mentions 
that corporate agency, in a radical understanding, might invoke the mysterious existence of the 
group person by referring to the ‘homunculus’ theory of the firm (Hess 2017, 170). 
Furthermore, Hindricks (2014) and Hasnas (2018) argue against List and Pettit’s autonomous 
group agent by pointing to the fact that granting moral autonomy to groups on a par with 
ordinary humans opens the gate for also granting groups basic human rights, such as the right 
to vote. Obviously, few would allow groups such as business corporations the democratic right 
to vote in elections, and therefore this is a reductio of the very idea of corporate moral agency.  
Tim Mulgan (2018, 3) comes to the rescue by offering a typology ranging from individualism 
to moderate collectivism and extreme collectivism. The distinction between moderate and 
extreme collectivism becomes significant in rendering corporate moral agency a credible 
notion. According to the moderate collectivism which is held by List and Pettit (according to 
Mulgan), “corporate groups are moral agents, but none are fully fledged moral persons. 
Corporate groups enjoy some rights (e.g. property, contract) and can be held responsible for 
their actions. But they do not enjoy human rights” (ibid.). According to Mulgan, extreme 
collectivism claims that “some corporate groups are both moral agents and moral persons. They 
have the same moral status as human beings and enjoy analogous rights” (ibid.). This is 
controversial, but List and Pettit also explicitly dismiss it (List & Pettit 2011, 181).  
However, in the future – according to Mulgan – we will need to make organizations accountable 
and much more trustworthy, with the emerging ecological crisis, resource scarcity, and digital 
beings in control of our lives as examples for this necessity. So, this provides reasons for taking 
extreme collectivism seriously. 
Now, the question is whether more comprehensive and substantial accounts of corporate moral 
agency, such as, for instance, the proposed political deliberative accounts (Scherer & Palazzo 
2007; Dubbink & Smith 2011; Sabadoz & Singer 2017; Pettit 2017) rely on extreme collectivist 
views, or whether they are moderate. The adherence to pragmatism found in Scherer and 
Palazzo’s Habermasian, liberal-republican approach explicitly gives priority to democracy over 
philosophy, and therefore aims at some level of neutrality on the metaphysics of corporate 
moral agency. French’s diachronic version of corporate moral responsibility raises similar 
questions. 
 
2. Corporate diachronic responsibility – the self-narrative  
The reading of French’s recent account of diachronic corporate agency and responsibility 
(2017) that I am going to suggest presents his theory as even more comprehensive when 
compared to his earlier theory (1979, 1984). Going from a fairly abstract corporate internal 
decision structure to now also including a ‘self-narrative’ based on “annual reports, in 
advertising, in legal documents, in internal and external statements of corporate culture, and in 
policies” (French 2017, 62) to account for organizational ‘sameness’ can be seen as allowing 
for a more comprehensive theory of corporate moral responsibility (cf. Tollefsen & Gallagher 
2017). 
Importantly, synchronic responsibility for current events at T1 remains as time goes by at T2 + 
Tn, unless the corporate self-narrative has changed at Tn (ibid. 57, 62-63). French is basically 
favoring operational connectedness as a criterion for corporate identity over time, but he also 
argues that organizational sameness, in cases where operational sameness is lost (e.g. when a 
corporation merges or it changes its policies and structure), can be preserved through the 
corporate ‘self-narrative’. Hence, difficult and controversial metaphysical disputes about the 
corporate agent’s identity over time can supplemented or substituted with a narrative approach. 
French emphasizes that the corporate self-narrative is not solely up to the discretion of the 
corporation itself. Rather, the narrative must not be manipulative about past events and acts, 
since “ignoring, forgetting, misdescribing, or allowing the firm’s public relations department 
to construct for its own ends the story of the firm’s past synchronically responsible misdeeds 
does not produce a qualifying corporate self-narrative for diachronic moral responsibility 
purposes” (ibid. 63). Internal and external checks and balances offer correction, in order to 
ensure that the “corporate self-narrative is a developmental element of the policy aspects of a 
corporate internal decision structure” (ibid. 62). 
French discusses the case of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster to show that whether BP is 
still responsible today can, in the narrative account, be disputed. He argues that it can, but the 
account raises questions about historic responsibility. 
 
3. Historic and future corporate responsibility: climate change and digitalization 
A recent study showed that two-thirds of all historic emissions can be traced to 90 corporations 
in the oil, coal, and gas industries, BP included: the so-called carbon majors (Heede 2014). 
Since there is a high likelihood, according to climate science, that these companies have caused 
anthropogenic climate change, they have now incurred a backward-looking responsibility to 
compensate climate victims but, according to Henry Shue (2017), they also have forward-
looking duties to stop climate change in the future. They should stop denying the facts of 
climate change through funding climate skepticism and curtailing climate politics through 
lobbying (Arnold 2016). The carbon majors could announce that now they have made a 
transition to renewables and hence, according to the self-narrative, they are not the same 
corporations that caused climate change – they are no longer responsible for past omissions and 
harms. Studies on historic corporate responsibility show how corporations seek to suppress 
facts and manipulate the narrative of their own history (Mena et al. 2016; Schrempf-Sterling 
2016). The topic of climate change is an example of how the future is inscribed in corporate 
responsibility – time and sustainability are intrinsically related (Bansal & DesJardine 2014). 
Developments in the digital economy, with the advent of artificial intelligence and the misuse 
of big data, also increases the need to make new digital corporate agents responsible (Zuboff 
2015; Zwitter 2014). Mulgan argues for a version of extreme collectivism which makes digital 
agents share the status of humans, in order to make them as accountable as possible (2018). 
 
The paper’s contribution, therefore, is to connect the topic of corporate moral agency with a 
more comprehensive account that takes time: past, present, and future, into account, in order to 
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